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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Luciano1
(decided June 3, 2008)
Ruben Luciano was charged with attempted murder, assault,
and criminal possession of a weapon.2 Before trial, jury selection
was comprised of sixteen potential jurors.3 During the voir dire proc-
ess, the People raised a Batson4 challenge, which required the defense
to provide a "gender-neutral" explanation for five of its peremptory
strikes.5 The trial court accepted the gender-neutral explanations for
three of the strikes, but concluded that the other two peremptory
strikes were pretextual and discriminatory,6 and therefore in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause under the U.S. Constitution 7 and the
New York Constitution.8 Consequently, the court "seated the [two
discriminatory strikes] and prohibited defense counsel from reusing
those peremptories." 9
Ultimately, Luciano was convicted of "criminal possession of
a weapon in the second degree and assault in the second degree, and
sentenced as a second felony offender to concurrent sentences of [fif-
890 N.E.2d 214 (N.Y. 2008).
2 Id. at 215.
3 id.
4 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall. . . deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the law."
8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."
9 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
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teen] years and [seven] years, respectively."' 0 Luciano appealed to
the Appellate Division, First Department which reversed, concluding
that "forfeiting two of [the] defendant's peremptory challenges vio-
lated the mandate of CPL 270.25(2) that each party 'must be allowed'
the statutorily prescribed number of challenges."" The People ap-
pealed, which presented the New York Court of Appeals with a case
of first impression: whether "forfeiting peremptory challenges used
in a discriminatory manner is a permissible remedy."'' 2 The court ul-
timately concluded that although this remedy is permissible, it is not
required and rather left to the discretion of the judge. 3
Luciano "allegedly confronted and shot Angel Rodriquez at
Rodriguez's place of employment." '14 During the voir dire process,
defense counsel asked the sixteen potential jurors two specific ques-
tions to each: first, "whether [the] witness [was] more likely to tell
the truth after taking an oath" and second, "whether the panelists had
formed an opinion as to [the] defendant's guilt before the presenta-
tion of evidence."'' 5 The People presented their challenges for cause,
which the court subsequently denied.' 6 Defense counsel "challenged
every potential juror who answered 'yes' to the oath question and 'I
don't know' to the guilt question."' 7 This too was rejected by the
1o Id.
1" Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 270.25 (McKinney 2008).
12 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 217.
13 Id. at 219.
14 Id.
1" Id. at 215-16.
16 Id. at 216.
17 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
1178 [Vol. 25
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court. 18
After the appropriate challenges for cause, the proceedings
continued with the People's right to exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges.' 9 The People exercised four peremptory challenges without
objection, which left five women and five men on the panel.20 The
defense counsel exercised its peremptory challenges and struck the
remaining five women and three men.2' In response to the striking of
the five women, the People raised a Batson22 challenge, which re-
quired the defense to provide a "gender-neutral" reason for each per-
emptory challenge. 23 The court accepted the gender-neutral explana-
tion for three of the women, but concluded that the other two
peremptory strikes were pretextual and discriminatory.24 The defense
counsel argued that the strikes were not pretextual and stated their
reasons for the challenges. 25 However, the court found inconsisten-
cies in the defense counsel's reasoning.26 Due to this inconsistency,
the court concluded that the challenges were in fact discriminatory
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
23 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
24 Id.
25 People v. Luciano, 840 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007). Juror number
six was challenged was because "she was raised in Rockland County and lived in Parkches-
ter, the Bronx, from which he concluded that she was conservative, and she answered the
oath question affirmatively .... " Id. Moreover, juror number one was challenged because
she too answered in the affirmative for the oath question and she stated "I don't know" to the
guilt question. Id.
26 Id. The court questioned why the defense counsel did not challenge juror number nine
"who also lived in Parkchester, nor juror number five, who also answered the oath question
affirmatively and gave the same response to the guilt question" as the juror who was chal-
lenged. Id.
2009] 1179
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and the two remaining women were seated on the jury.27 Further-
more, since it was found that the two peremptory challenges were
pretextual, the judge concluded that the defense should be precluded
from reusing the misused challenges.28 The defense attempted to es-
tablish their good faith by offering to strike "one of the male panelists
on the same ground," but the judge was not convinced, stating that, "
'[b]ecause [defense counsel] misstated the law [it does not have the
right to use its challenges]. The law states that if you exercise the
strikes [on a discriminatory basis] you forfeit those rights.' ,,29
As a result, Luciano was convicted and sentenced to prison.30
The appellate division reversed, holding that the trial court "improp-
erly denied [the] defendant the requisite number of peremptory chal-
lenges," as provided by CPL 270.25 .3 1 Ultimately, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, "but on different grounds.,
32
The Court of Appeals recognized that the accused's right to
peremptory challenges is "not a trial tool . . [they] are a mainstay in a
litigant's strategic arsenal. 33 This right is outlined in the Criminal
Procedure Law, which states that "each party 'must be allowed' an
equal number of peremptory challenges and that a court 'must ex-
clude' any juror challenged., 34 Furthermore, this had been the stan-
dard procedure until 1986 when the Supreme Court decided Batson v.
27 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
33 Id.
34 Id.
[Vol. 251180
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Kentucky.35 Prior to Batson, it was acceptable for "litigants [to] chal-
lenge a potential juror for any or no reason at all."36 In Batson, the
Court established that when a litigant exercises his or her peremptory
challenge to strike a juror based on discriminatory reasons, it was a
direct violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.37 The Court of Appeals in Luciano analyzed Batson and con-
cluded that permitting forfeiture to be a remedy for the wrongful use
of peremptory challenges would in turn promote the overall principle
of Batson.38 The court noted that the " 'purpose of the Batson rule is
to eliminate discrimination, not minimize it,' " and by allowing the
courts to exercise discretion in assigning forfeiture, it will deter liti-
gants from making discriminatory peremptory challenges. 39  The
court reasoned that if forfeiture was precluded there would be no de-
terring effect and in essence litigants would still be able to strike ju-
rors for any cause, attempt to provide neutral reasoning and if unsuc-
cessful, the litigant would not lose anything for her unconstitutional
attempt to discriminate.4 °
Ultimately, the Luciano Court did not decide whether there
was a Batson violation or not. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ana-
lyze Batson and the appropriate case precedent leading up to Batson
in order to determine if the forfeiture remedy is permissible and con-
stitutional. The underlying issue when determining whether forfei-
35 Id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
36 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 216.
37 Id.
" Id. at 218
39 Id. (quoting People v. Bolling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (N.Y. 1992)).
40 Id.
2009] 1181
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ture is a permissible remedy to a Batson violation is whether there is
a Batson violation to begin with.
It is important to analyze the cases which ultimately lead up
to the Batson decision in order to fully understand its implication to-
day. In 1880, the United States Supreme Court decided Strauder v.
West Virginia,4 1 which held that an African-American man, just like a
Caucasian man, was entitled to the protections afforded under the
Equal Protection Clause. 42 In Strauder, an African-American man
was "indicted [sic] for murder in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, in
West Virginia.' '43 Pursuant to a statute at the time of the initial trial,
African-Americans were not allowed to partake in the jury process. 44
Before the trial commenced, the defendant argued that the case
should be removed to the United States Circuit Court because based
on the current statute:
[N]o colored man was eligible to be a member of the
grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the State; that
white men are so eligible, and that by reason of his be-
ing a colored man and having been a slave, he had rea-
son to believe, and did believe, he could not have the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in
the State of West Virginia for the security of his per-
son as is enjoyed by white citizens.45
Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted and sentenced. 46 How-
41 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
42 Id. at 309.
41 Id. at 304.
44 Id. at 305 (stating that, " 'All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and
who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors .......
41 Id. at 304.
46 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
1 182 [Vol. 25
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ever, the Supreme Court agreed with Strauder's equal protection ar-
gument and reversed the lower court's decision.47
The Court distinguished that the issue was not whether a
criminal defendant has the right to a jury composed in whole or in
part of people who are the same race as him, rather the issue was
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated when the composition of the jury is conducted in a discrimi-
natory manner.48 The Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was created to ensure that the newly
freed slaves would be granted the same rights under the U.S. Consti-
tution as enjoyed by white citizens and that no State shall deprive any
African-American citizen of those rights.49 The Court concluded that
the West Virginia statute clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause
and stated that "[i]t is not easy to comprehend how ... every white
man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own
race or color ... and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by
the law with the former." 50
Moreover, in 1965, the Supreme Court decided Swain v. Ala-
41 Id. at 310-12.
48 Id. at 305. This case is specifically important to the analysis because at the time it was
decided, the Fourteenth Amendment was a recent addition to the United States Constitution
and judicial interpretation was important to direct the social changes which were happening
within the country, specifically the freedom of the slaves. Id. The Court noted that this
amendment was mainly created to "secur[e] to a race recently emancipated, a race that
through many generations had been held in slavery, all of the civil rights that the superior
race enjoy." Id. at 306.
49 Id. at 306; see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (stating that, "[f]or racial
discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service or otherwise qualified groups not
only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con-
cepts of a democratic society and a representative government").
50 Strouder, 100 U.S. at 309.
11832009]
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bama,51 which held that the use of peremptory challenges in a dis-
criminatory manner was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.52 In Swain, "Robert Swain, a Negro, was indicted and con-
victed of rape in the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Alabama,
and sentenced to death., 53 Swain contended that when the prosecu-
tion used its peremptory challenges, it struck the six remaining Afri-
can- American jurors for racially discriminatory reasons.54 Swain ar-
gued that such use of peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights and he moved to have the jury considered void.55
The Court thoroughly examined the historical basis of peremptory
challenges and concluded that the use of peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The Court considered the use of peremptory challenges to be a tool
for securing a well-balanced jury of citizens throughout the commu-
nity and stated that:
[W]e cannot hold that the Constitution requires an ex-
amination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise
of his challenges in any given case. The presumption
in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is us-
ing the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial
jury to try the case before the court.5
Furthermore, the Court explained that the purpose behind the use of
" 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
52 Id. at 219, 222.
51 Id. at 203.
14, Id. at 210.
55 Id.
56 Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
17 Id. at 222.
1184 [Vol. 25
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peremptory challenges is to allow each side to strike jurors without
providing any cause or reason for their actions.58 However, the Court
recognized that if a defendant could demonstrate that such discrimi-
nation occurred on a regular basis from the same opposing party, a
proper equal protection challenge could arise, but Swain did not meet
this standard and thus the Court did not examine it further.59
Following the Swain decision, the Court went on to further
expand on the issue. In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Batson v.
Kentucky, the leading case dealing with equal protection and peremp-
tory challenges. 60 In Batson, the defendant was "indicted in Ken-
tucky on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods., 61 During voir dire, the prosecutor used his peremptory chal-
lenges and eliminated the four black persons sitting on the venire,
leaving the jury composed of only white individuals.62 The defense
motioned to have the jury discharged on the grounds that the four po-
tential jurors were removed based on their race; this was a direct vio-
lation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights because the defendant was not being properly tried by a "jury
drawn from a cross section of the community., 63 The trial judge did
not agree, stating that "the parties were entitled to use their peremp-
tory challenges to 'strike anybody they want to.' ",64 Ultimately, the
5 Id. at 220.
9 Id. at 224-28.
60 Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
61 Id. at 82.
62 Id. at 82-83.
63 Id. at 83.
64 Id.
2009] 1185
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jury convicted the defendant on both counts.65 The defendant ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky and argued that "the facts
showed that the prosecutor had engaged in a 'pattern' of discrimina-
tory challenges in this case and established an equal protection viola-
tion under Swain."66 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, as-
serting that in order to be successful, the defendant had to
demonstrate that there was a "systematic exclusion of a group of ju-
rors from the venire.' '67 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and reversed.68
Initially, the Court re-examined the Strauder decision and
stated that it was well established that denying a juror the right to
serve on a jury because of his race denies that individual his right to
equal protection and thus amounts to a constitutional violation.69
Next, the Court reflected on the Swain decision and ultimately de-
cided that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.,, 70 The
Court established that the burden of proof that is placed on the defen-
dant, as outlined in Swain, is not proper and instead created a modem
approach for presenting a prime facia case for such discrimination.7'
First, the burden is still on the defendant to allege that peremptory
challenges are being used in a discriminatory manner.72 Also, the de-
65 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
66 Id. at 84; see also Swain, 380 U.S. 202.
67 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
68 id.
69 Id. at 85-87.
70 Id. at 89.
71 Id. at 93.
72 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
1186 [Vol. 25
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fendant must show that he is a member of the group that is being dis-
criminated against. 73 Unlike Swain, Batson established that the de-
fendant can rely solely on the discrimination of his case rather than
presenting a pattern of discrimination.74 The burden then shifts to the
State to provide non-discriminatory reasons for the challenges
through a clear showing that the excluded juror was removed based
on a reason other than race.75 Subsequently, the court must decide
whether the State's rebuttal is sufficient to survive the defendant's
prima facie discrimination case.76 The underlining holding of Batson
is that peremptory challenges cannot be used in a discriminatory
manner. 77 Such use not only violates the defendant's equal protection
rights but also violates the juror's right to serve as a juror.78
The federal common law established that the use of peremp-
tory challenges in a discriminatory manner is unconstitutional. States
have adopted this ruling and adhere to at least the minimal require-
ments that are presented through the federal cases in assuring that
peremptory challenges are not used in a discriminatory manner. New
York is no exception. New York adopted the test set forth in Batson
when determining whether or not a sufficient case of discrimination
has been presented.79
73 Id.
74 Id. at 95.
75 Id. at 94. This cannot be accomplished by simply stating that the strike was not based
on a discriminatory manner; sufficient reasoning must be put forth. Id.
76 Id. at 98.
77 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87.
78 Id. at 87.
79 People v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 1173, 1174 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235,
1240 (N.Y. 1990).
2009] 1187
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In People v. Allen,80 the defendant was charged with incest
and sexual abuse. 81 During voir dire, the prosecutor used fourteen
peremptory challenges against male jurors.82 The defendant moved
for a mistrial, stating that the prosecution used its peremptory chal-
lenges in a discriminatory manner based on gender.83 Before the
People could provide gender-neutral explanations, the trial court de-
nied the motion and the defendant appealed.84 The appellate division
held that the "trial court erred in summarily denying a mistrial with-
out requiring the People to offer neutral reasons. 85
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals analyzed the steps
that need to be taken by both the defendant and prosecution when
charged with using peremptory challenges in a discriminatory man-
ner.86 First, when the prosecution has allegedly used its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner, the defense has to "raise the
inference" of such misconduct to the court.87 Secondly, in response,
the prosecution has to provide a neutral explanation for the peremp-
tory challenge and the court must determine whether or not the rea-
soning set forth by the prosecution is truthful or pretextual. 88 In Al-
len, the court concluded that the prosecution met its burden in
offering gender-neutral explanations in response to the challenges
and elaborated that this step in the analysis required a two-prong
80 Allen, 653 N.E.2d at 1173.
81 Id. at 1175.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Allen, 653 N.E.2d at 1175.
86 Id. at 1177-78 (citing Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991)).
87 Id. at 1177.
88 Id.
[Vol. 251188
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process.89 First, "if the prosecutor offers no explanation, the defen-
dant has succeeded in meeting the ultimate burden of establishing an
equal protection violation" and second, "[i]f, however, the prosecutor
offers facially neutral reasons supporting the challenge, the inference
of discrimination is overcome." 90  Furthermore, the court asserted
that the explanation could be any "facially neutral reason" even if it is
one that does not make much sense; in essence, it can be anything so
long as it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.91
Moreover, not only did Allen emphasize the procedure that
must be followed in raising a Batson challenge in New York, it also
established that jury service is a privilege afforded under the New
York Constitution, 92 and depriving an individual of this privilege
based on race or gender not only violates the defendant's equal pro-
tection rights but also violates the excluded juror's equal protection
rights by preventing participation in the governmental and democratic
process as granted by the state constitution.
93
Further, in People v. Kern,94 the New York Court of Appeals
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution is
analogous to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.95
In Kern, defendants were convicted of manslaughter "and other
charges arising out of their participation in an attack by a group of
'9 Id. at 1177-78.
9' Allen, 653 N.E.2d at 1177.
91 Id. at 1178 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)).
92 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1 states, in pertinent part: "No member of this state shall be dis-
franchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof ... 
93 Allen, 653 N.E.2d at 1177.
94 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990).
9' Id. at 1240.
2009] 1189
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white teen-agers upon three black men in the community of Howard
Beach in Queens., 96 At trial, on the first day of jury selection, "de-
fense counsel successfully challenged for cause one of the four black
jurors on the panel ... and subsequently peremptorily challenged all
three black jurors. 97 The trial court held that the defense counsel
could not use peremptory challenges to strike jurors in a discrimina-
tory manner and ruled that the Batson application was applicable to
the defense just as much as it was to the prosecution.9" Ultimately,
the defendants were convicted and appealed, arguing that "neither the
State nor the Federal Constitutions prohibit a criminal defendant from
exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 99
The Court of Appeals re-examined Batson and stated that the
equal protection rights afforded under the New York Constitution are
coextensive with the U.S. Constitution when pertaining to equal pro-
tection for the defendants and therefore the prosecution cannot use
peremptory challenges based on discriminatory reasons.100 Further-
more, the court adopted the Batson test for setting forth a prima facie
case for alleged discrimination.'0 1  Finally, the court addressed
whether the concepts laid out in Batson applied to the defense just as
96 Id. at 1236.
9' Id. at 1239.
98 Id.
99 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1240.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1241; see also Batson 476 U.S. at 96
First, the defendant is required to establish a prima facia case of dis-
crimination by demonstrating that (1) he or she is a member of a cogni-
zable racial group, (2) the prosecution has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude a member of that group from the petit jury, and (3)
"these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference" of
purposeful discrimination.
1190 [Vol. 25
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much as they did to the prosecution. 0 2 The court dissected the Equal
Protection Clause of the New York Constitution into two separate
parts. It analyzed the first part, which states that " '[n]o person shall
be denied the equal protections of the laws of this state' "as the equal
protection right that is illustrated in the U.S. Constitution.0 3 The
court further explained that the protections that have been established
by the U.S. Constitution and those principles outlined in Batson are
the same as the principles followed in the New York Constitution. 10 4
Next, the court analyzed the second sentence of the New York Con-
stitution's Equal Protection Clause, which states that " '[n]o person
shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights . . . by the state or any agency or
subdivision of the state.' ,105 The court determined that this prong
applied to a citizen's civil right to serve on a jury. 106 The court con-
cluded that depriving a citizen of his or her civil rights "harms the
excluded juror by denying this opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of justice."'10 7 It does not matter if the defense or the
prosecution causes this deprivation; either way it is unconstitutional
because it results in a deprivation of individual rights.
The federal common law has established that depriving a citi-
zen of his or her right to participate on a jury due to that individuals'
race, gender, or any other significant group characteristic is unconsti-
102 Id. at 1241; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1.
103 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1241.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1241-42.
107 Id. at 1242.
2009] 1191
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tutional because it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The concern of using peremptory chal-
lenges in a discriminatory manner can, and has, been known to vio-
late equal protections in two different ways. First, the accused is de-
nied the equal protections of the laws when jurors are excused based
on race or gender. l08 It has been well established that it is the consti-
tutional right of the accused to be tried before a jury of his or her
peers. Refusing to sit a particular juror due to a group characteristic
would violate the accused's equal protection rights. Second, the right
to serve on a jury is a constitutional privilege that is granted to all
citizens, and by excluding a juror based on a discriminatory reason
deprives that juror of his or her constitutional right to serve on a jury
and participate in the legal system.' 09
Both the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution
provide the same equal protection rights for an accused at trial. Both
exemplify through direct language that depriving an accused of his or
her rights to be heard by a jury of his or her peers is a violation of
that person's equal protection rights." 0
One significant difference that is present between the U.S.
and New York Constitutions is the incorporation of the right to sit on
a jury. The federal common law has established and interpreted that
depriving an individual of his or her right to sit on a jury based on
race or color denies that person their right to fulfill their duty as a
108 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
'09 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
1192 [Vol. 25
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citizen and participate in the democratic system."'1 Accordingly, this
denies that individual her equal protection rights. New York has es-
tablished this concept through its common law but it is further recog-
nized and portrayed in the New York Constitution. 112 Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, New York directly states that the right to serve on a jury
is a privilege.' 13 This leaves little room for error and is probably the
more sound approach, because over time the court systems change
and the various judges interpret concepts differently. By addressing
the concept directly, the New York Constitution leaves little room for
interpretation and provides concrete certainty that rights will not be
violated.
Nevertheless, it is thoroughly established that discrimination
in any courtroom in the United States will not be tolerated. Both the
U.S. Constitution and federal common law as well as the New York
State Constitution and state common law have laid out similar inter-
pretations when dealing with peremptory challenges and equal pro-
tection rights. The federal common law has sound precedent that out-
lines the analysis that a court would have to endure if a challenge on
a peremptory was made.1 14 The New York common law has outlined
and adopted the federal tests verbatim into the state system.1 15
In Luciano, the main issue was not whether there was a con-
stitutional violation but rather whether the judge's discretion to as-
... See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
112 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
113 Id.; see also Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1242.
114 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
"' SeeAllen, 653 N.E.2d at 1177.
2009l 1193
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sign forfeiture as a remedy was proper.1"6 Prior to determining
whether this is a viable remedy, the underlying right of equal protec-
tion had to be analyzed. However, minimal case law on the federal
level exists when determining whether or not this is appropriate.
Federal common law has established a substantially sound interpreta-
tion that using peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner
does represent a constitutional violation. Nevertheless, the New
York court took this one step further and applied the federal law to
determine that by allowing forfeiture as a remedy it in turn furthers
the basic concepts outlined in Batson and all applicable federal
precedent. This results in a great distinction between the federal and
the New York common law on the relevant topic. Through Luciano,
which is a case of first impression, New York has for the first time
has established that this remedy is appropriate. On the other hand,
the federal common law been generally silent on the issue. Luciano
does not reach the conclusion of whether or not there was a Batson
violation, but based on overwhelming precedent the court might have
concluded that there was a violation.
The Equal Protection Clause provides rights that are so fun-
damental that the courts have been reluctant to allow such discrimina-
tory misuse of peremptory challenges. If such conduct were allowed,
a slippery slope of peremptory violations may result. Thus, by allow-
ing forfeiture of peremptory challenges it directly deters litigants
from abusing the privilege. Accordingly, this affirms the underlying
reasoning behind the Equal Protection Clause as well as the estab-
116 Luciano, 890 N.E.2d at 218.
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lished Supreme Court precedent on the topic.
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DUE PROCESS
United States Constitution Amendment XIV:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
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